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1 Introduction
* 
The European labour market is often characterised by its low mobility, both within as
well as between countries. Since the introduction of EMU, this problem has become
more prominent, as the mobility of labour is one of the few short-term adjustment
mechanisms that are still left. One reason for the low labour mobility in Europe is that
there are cultural and linguistic barriers. This, however, does not explain the differences
in interregional mobility within a country or changes in labour mobility through time.
In a series of papers, Oswald (1997,1999) has proposed the idea that home-owners are
less willing to move in order to find a job than renters. This is due to the high transaction
and moving costs involved (especially the real estate sales taxes). With aggregated
regional data Oswald shows that unemployment is negatively correlated with home-
ownership. Oswald’s theory is based on micro-economic assumptions. Most of the
studies testing the Oswald thesis, however, use macro- or mesoeconomic data. These
data are aggregated and do not reveal the underlying microeconomic relationships.
Instead of using macro- or mesoeconomic data, we will therefore use microeconomic
data to correct for spurious relationships and identify Oswald’s effect.
In this paper a model will be estimated with micro-panel data for the Netherlands. With
these data, both movements on the housing market and on the labour market are
followed in order to address the following questions:
1) Is the probability of job-transition lower for home-owners than for renters?
2) Is the probability of becoming unemployed higher for home-owners than for renters?
For the above mentioned model we use a panel-data set that is collected by the Dutch
tax department (Income Panel Research data (IPR); for 1989-1998). In the IPR, about
75 thousand individuals are followed over time. These individuals can change between
jobs, between unemployment and employment, between houses and between regions.
The IPR-data allow us to model three transition processes that may be mutually
dependent: (1) transitions between jobs, (2) transitions in and out of unemployment and
(3) transitions on the housing market. In modeling these transitions, several variables
in the IPR may be useful: age, income, the number of children, gender, whether some
one has received disability benefits, home-ownership, job tenure, and benefit or housing6
duration. With this information, we will measure the effect of home-ownership while
correcting for other characteristics. 
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Paragraph 2 will describe the literature
on the relationship between the housing market and labour mobility. Paragraph 3 will
give the model. The data will be presented in paragraph 4. In paragraph 5, the results
and conclusions are presented.
2 Theory and Review
Most contributions in the field of labour migration use the Harris Todaro model as a
starting point. In Harris and Todaro (1970) a neo-classical model is developed in which
(international) migration is caused by geographic differences in the supply and demand
for labour. Regions with a relatively limited supply of labour in relation to capital will
generally have a relatively higher wage that will attract a large inflow of labour from
low wage regions. This inflow of labour is mirrored by an outflow of capital. 
Oswald (1999) analyses also in a macroeconomic framework the interrelation between
employment, the structure of the housing market and commuting activities. In a
theoretical model he shows that home-owners are less likely to migrate (to move) if a
negative demand shock occurs in his region. They will prefer to commute to another
region, instead of moving or become unemployed. So ownership of a house results into
a less flexible response to low regional demand for labour.  There are four hypotheses
that result from this theory:
I)  Employed home-owners are less likely to move than renters.
II) Unemployed home-owners are less likely to move than unemployed renters.
III ) Home-owners are less likely to move to another job than renters, because they are
not willing to leave the  region.
IV ) Home-owners are more likely to become unemployed than renters.
From this, it follows that regions with a relatively high percentage of home-owners will
have less migration than other regions. 
Harris and Todaro created a macroeconomic model based on microeconomic
assumptions described in Borjas (1990). In the model by Borjas, migrants compare the
cost of moving to alternative locations while maximizing the expected discounted net
return over a certain time horizon. The difference between the net expected earnings7
corresponds to individual skills in the region of origin compared to the region of
destination. The expected earnings in the region of destination are found by multiplying
this difference with the probability of finding a job. By subtracting the expected costs
of moving, one may find the expected net return of migration. The outcome of the
microeconomic model differs slightly from that of the macroeconomic model. The main
difference is that movements between regions depend both on the differentials in wages
and in unemployment rates. This last factor determines the probability of finding a job.
Another difference is that high skilled workers are expected to move more than low
skilled workers do. 
Various authors have tested these theories empirically. Most of them use a
macroeconomic setting, for example Oswald (1999), who analyzes the relationship
between home-ownership and unemployment using panel data of 19 OECD countries
from 1960 to 1990. With these data, Oswald shows that unemployment is positively
correlated with home-ownership, with an elasticity equal to 0,2. This means that a rise
of home-ownership with 10 percent point results in an increase in unemployment of 2%
point. This relationship is not only found between countries, but also between the
regions of France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The explanatory power of these univariate regressions were, however, quite small
for France, Italy and the United States.      
Hassink and Curvers (1999) show for the Netherlands that Oswald theses are not
supported when tested on a mesoeconomic level. They estimate the relation between
unemployment rate and home-ownership for 348 regions for the period 1990-1998. They
find that home-ownership has a negative effect on unemployment, implicating that
home-ownership diminishes instead of increasing unemployment. Probably, there exists
simultaneity between unemployment and house-ownership. Unemployment has a
negative effect on home-ownership. Apparently, this is picked up by the estimations. 
If we focus on the relationship between labour mobility and the developments in the
housing market from a microeconomic perspective, several empirical contributions have
been made. Using microeconomic panel data (British Household Panel Survey), Henley
(1998) finds for the United Kingdom that unemployed people have lower probability to
move than working people. Boeheim and Taylor (2000) come to a different result. Using
probit-models with pooled data for the United Kingdom, they find that unemployment
in a region increases the probability to move. In accordance with Oswald’s theses, they
find that home-owners change less from jobs than renters. 
For the Netherlands, Van Ommeren (1996) estimates a search model for job movers8
based on a retrospective panel data set from the beginning of the nineties. He focuses
only on job movers and finds that owners are less likely to move to another house than
renters are. He concludes that no significant evidence exists that job and residential
moves are mutually related. 
3 Model
In this paper we use hazard rate or, stated differently, duration models to examine the
job duration and residential tenures. The hazard rate is defined as the rate at which an
event takes place over a short period of time, given that this event has not occurred. In
the context of our model, this event may concern labour market or housing market
transitions.
Given a certain state, for example that of being an employee at a specific job, several
types of transitions may take place: that into another job, becoming unemployed, or
becoming nonparticipant. Therefore, the hazard rate out of employment is modeled into
three possible ‘competing risks’. The impact of several exogenous variables, like age,
sex or income, may vary with respect to these risks. For movements on the housing
market, the competing risks are: movement to an owned house, to a rental house, or to
other house types like housing for the elderly or living at home with family (see also
appendix I for an explanation of a hazard rate model) .
In our model, we try to correct for as many exogenous variables that we have.
Obviously, not all relevant variables for describing house movements and labour market
mutations are available in the data set. Examples of variables, that are probably relevant
but not presented in the data set, are education and ethnical background. Due to these
unobserved characteristics the individuals are not homogeneous, some so called
unobservable heterogeneity will remain. As a result, estimates, for example the one
describing the impact of home-ownership on job-to-job mobility, may be biased. 
Within the context of duration models, several methods have been developed to correct
for unobserved heterogeneity. To minimize the impact of distributional assumptions, we
adopt a nonparametric method introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984). They assume
that a sample consists of two (or more) subsamples with different levels of unobservable
effects. Then, for all subsamples the concerning weights are estimated, as well as the
impact of unobserved differences on the hazard.9
In the hazard rate models presented below most characteristics do not vary over time,
but are defined at the beginning of the duration spell. The most relevant variables
however do vary over time: these variables describe the labour market characteristics
and the housing market characteristics. In this way we can take into account that, for
example, a job mover may not change from house. Further, we have to be aware that the
variables that change overtime only do so on a calendar-year base. So residential
transitions coincide with a job movement within a calendar year, whereas the exact
sequence of events is unknown.
4 Data
The IPR (Income Panel Research) database consists of a sample of about 75000
individuals that are followed yearly, over the period 1989-1998 by tax authorities. A
number of possible housing states and labour market states are distinguished. The states
for the labour market are based on individual income states like social assistance (SA)
benefits, unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, income and no income. From these
income states, one can derive the data at which a person becomes unemployed (SA or
UI- benefit), or nonparticipant (no income or disability benefit). Further, since we know
the identity of the employer, it is possible to keep track of job-to-job changes. Moving
behaviour can be derived from address changes. The states of the housing market consist
of rental housing or owner-housing or other types. Other house types are, for example,
housing for the elderly. For each individual, we observe a complete or incomplete
unemployment spell, together with various individual characteristics. For each of the
populations examined (home-owners, renters and employees), a random sample was
drawn of 10 % of the total sample. In the estimations the spells of the different
individuals are used. It is possible that one individual with several spells is several times
represented in the sample.  
Operationalization of the model 
Given the IPR, the following variables are used in the empirical analysis:
(1)  Age at time of moment of entry of the house or of the working force.
(2)  High education. This (proxy) dummy variable indicates whether a person has
received a scholarship for university education.
(3)  Receiving child support, or not.
(4)  Having a partner who earns income, or not.
(5)  Marital status. Being Married or not.10
(6) Gender.
(7)  A ‘health-dummy’. This dummy indicates whether a person has 
received disability benefits in the past. Here, it should be mentioned that not all
the disability beneficiaries in the IPR database could be properly identified. 
8)  Wage in logs.
Table 1 Description of variables (mean and standard deviation)
(End of 1998)


















Female 0.51 0.0085 0.54 0.0088 0.41 0.0081
Working partner 0.48 0.0085 0.15 0.0064 0.37 0.0080
Children 0.20 0.0068 0.11 0.0057 0.33 0.0078
High Education 0.01 0.0016 0.07 0.0046 0.11 0.0051
Disabled 0.02 0.0026 0.03 0.0030 0.01 0.0016
Age (years) 40.01 0.2176 42.07 0.32 31.81 0.17
Married 0.74 0.0074 0.47 0.0088 0.47 0.0082
Wage 1.81 0.0064
Job mutation 0.09 0.0050 0.11 0.0056
Employed 0.54 0.0085 0.31 0.0082
Unemployed 0.02 0.0026 0.12 0.0057
Nonparticipant 0.44 0.0085 0.57 0.0088
Home-owners 0.52 0.0082
Renters 0.31 0.0076
Other housetypes 0.17 0.0062
* unless defined otherwise11
In Table 1, the characteristics of three samples are described, namely that of home-
owners, renters and employees. Renters and home-owners may be employed,
unemployed or nonparticipant. Employees may live in a rental or owned house, or in
other types of housing like student colleges and homes for the elderly. From Table 1 it
appears, that home-owners are less often unemployed, more often employed, and less
often nonparticipant than renters are. Remarkably, the percentage of people that change
from job is almost the same for renters and home-owners. Home-owners move less often
than renters (see the average duration period). In the next paragraph, we will analyze
whether this is a true, or a spurious effect. Home-owners have more often a working
partner and children, and are more often married compared to renters. Of the employees,
the percentage for men is higher than for woman, 37 % has a working partner and 33 %
have children, 11% have studied recently. The average age of starting a new job is close
to 32 years. Since both young people and the elderly have a preference of renting a
house the average age is around 42 years.
5 Estimation results
Basically, the predictions made by Oswald can be divided in two groups. Two theses are
about the effect of labour market states on the housing mobility and housing types,
whereas the other two are about the effect of the housing type on the labour market. We
first discuss the impact of labour market states on housing mobility (see Table 2):
With respect to the different labour market states, we distinguish between employed
workers, unemployed workers and nonparticipants. A further distinction is made
between employed workers that stay in their job, and those that have moved to another
job in a particular year. First, let us consider the housing mobility of employed workers
that have stayed in their jobs. According to Oswald’s theory, these workers are less
likely to move if they own a house. Clearly, our results lend credence to this hypothesis.
However, from this finding alone we cannot conclude that home-ownership hampers
mobility, e.g. mobility that is needed to reduce commuting time. Instead, it may be that
the causality between home-ownership and job commitment runs the other way around.12
Table 2 A hazard rate model for housing durations of renters and house-
owners: the impact of the labour market on moving behaviour 
Parameter Estimates Standard Error
Reference group ￿ 1.9292 0.0521
Job mutation 0.2298 0.0650
Unemployed ￿ 0.5676 0.0535
Nonparticipant ￿ 0.6696 0.0402
Job mutation+owner 0.2255 0.1123
Unemployed+owner 0.5098 0.0819
Nonparticipant+owner 0.6469 0.0657
Job+owner ￿ 0.7569 0.0411
Age 25-35 years ￿ 0.1137 0.0476
Age 35-45 years ￿ 0.3488 0.0527
Age>45 years ￿ 0.0547 0.0508
Women ￿ 0.0288 0.0294
Children 0.0957 0.0212
Working partner 0.0043 0.0348
Married 0.0247 0.0268
High education ￿ 0.0698 0.0883
Mean log-likelihood ￿ 1.57495
Number of cases 12333
 
The need for mobility may be more relevant for workers that have moved to other jobs.
Our results indicate that these transitions are associated with higher mobility on the
housing market, both for home-owners and renters. However, here we also find home-
owners to be more mobile than renters, which is at odds with Oswald’s theory. Finally,
unemployed workers and nonparticipants that rent a house are found to be less mobile
than employed workers. For home-owners, such an effect cannot be detected, which is
at odds with Oswald’s theory. Thus, home-owners that loose their job seem to be more
mobile than renters are. There may be several reasons for this:
• First, unemployed home-owners may adjust their cost of living ￿ in particular their
housing costs -- by moving to another house. This may be a rental house, as it may
be easier to obtain than another owned house. In this context, it is important to note13
that, in the nineties, there has not been a major downswing in the housing market.
Obviously, Oswald’s theory is more relevant in such periods, when home-owners
that move to another area are faced with high losses, due to a depressed housing
market. This will discourage them to move in order to find a job.
• Second, in the Netherlands unemployed home-owners are not entitled to social
assistance if they have too much own capital. Thus, home-owners can be forced to
spend this capital, and have a strong incentive to find a job.
• Third, house renters are insured against loss of income by means of  rent subsidies.
This mechanism lowers the incentive to find jobs.
Next to the labour market states, we included some more variables that may explain
housing mobility. Housing mobility decreases until individuals have reached the age of
45, and increases again for older groups. Next to this, we only find the impact of having
children to be significant, and positive. The low explanatory power of most of the
(other) coefficients can be explained by the fact that these characteristics affect the
choice between the rental sector or the house owned sector and to a lesser extent the
decision to move.
If we focus on the effect of the housing market on the labour market, Oswald’s theory
predicts that home-owners are less inclined to change from jobs and (therefore) are more
vulnerable for unemployment. From Table 3, we conclude that home-owners indeed
experience fewer job-to-job transitions, but they also have a smaller risk of becoming
either nonparticipant, or unemployed. This result is found both for the model with and
without unobserved heterogeneity. This result can be explained in two ways:14
Table 3 A competing risk model of job durations: the effects of housing market
characteristics (with and without unobserved heterogeneity)
Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. err.
Parameters
Job mutation
Reference group ￿ 1.0528 0.0285 ￿ 1.6376 0.0544
Home￿ owner ￿ 0.2518 0.0299 ￿ 0.1871 0.0352
Other housetypes ￿ 0.0392 0.0314 ￿ 0.169 0.0376
Age 25￿ 35 years ￿ 0.1611 0.0323 ￿ 0.2214 0.0411
Age 35￿ 45 years ￿ 0.4459 0.0423 ￿ 0.5491 0.0526
Age>45 years ￿ 0.6434 0.0549 ￿ 0.8075 0.0653
Women ￿ 0.158 0.0233 ￿ 0.1302 0.0295
Children 0.0092 0.0143 0.0199 0.0173
Working partner 0.0667 0.0301 0.017 0.0375
Disability ￿ 0.0946 0.1502 ￿ 0.1386 0.1778
High education 0.379 0.0312 0.3169 0.0414
Married ￿ 0.3093 0.0116 ￿ 0.2959 0.0147
Wage ￿ 0.2518 0.0347 ￿ 0.3231 0.0431
Nonparticipant
Reference group ￿ 1.6843 0.0404 ￿ 2.2063 0.0649
Home￿ owner ￿ 0.2963 0.042 ￿ 0.2576 0.0461
Other housetypes ￿ 0.0217 0.042 ￿ 0.1475 0.047
Age 25￿ 35 years ￿ 0.3854 0.0511 ￿ 0.4183 0.0572
Age 35￿ 45 years ￿ 0.5731 0.0612 ￿ 0.6429 0.0687
Age>45 years 0.1104 0.0595 0.0129 0.0704
Women ￿ 0.0313 0.0301 ￿ 0.0122 0.035
Children 0.1008 0.0156 0.1194 0.0185
Working partner ￿ 0.1364 0.0445 ￿ 0.1648 0.0498
Disability 0.1149 0.1834 0.0793 0.2085
High education 0.2756 0.0407 0.2203 0.0481
Married ￿ 0.5525 0.0121 ￿ 0.5634 0.0154
Wage 0.031 0.0498 ￿ 0.0516 0.056615
Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. err.
Unemployed
Reference group ￿ 2.5068 0.0627 ￿ 4.024 0.1795
Home￿ owner ￿ 0.8474 0.0676 ￿ 0.7883 0.0733
Other housetypes ￿ 0.4517 0.0697 ￿ 0.6392 0.0773
Age 25￿ 35 years 0.1326 0.0693 0.0268 0.0797
Age 35￿ 45 years ￿ 0.1577 0.0868 ￿ 0.32 0.0975
Age>45 years 0.092 0.0973 ￿ 0.1601 0.1111
Women ￿ 0.0141 0.0528 0.0455 0.0597
Children 0.0911 0.0331 0.0953 0.037
Working partner ￿ 0.1441 0.0678 ￿ 0.2105 0.0759
Disability 0.4845 0.22 0.4007 0.2617
High education 0.1965 0.0798 0.096 0.0922
Married ￿ 0.1947 0.0313 ￿ 0.153 0.0353
Wage ￿ 0.2849 0.0719 ￿ 0.3813 0.0813




Mean loglikelihood ￿ 1.99864 ￿ 1.96243
Number of cases 17071 17071
￿2 (4) = 1236,282, the H0-hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity is rejected16
On the one hand, the current model may be too restrictive to take into account the
interaction effects between housing type and labour market transitions. Obviously, the
decision of buying a house and the commitment to work are interrelated. There may be
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated both with housing types and the competing
risks in the duration model, which results in biased estimates. In our job duration model,
we tested for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. A Likelihood Ratio test shows
that the inclusion of such unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit of our duration
model substantially (see the appendix for details). This suggests that unobserved
heterogeneity is important. Suppose that this heterogeneity is correlated with the
decision process of buying a house, then the estimated coefficient of home-ownership
is spurious. Thus, more thorough estimation methods, in which the housing type as well
as the hazard rate are modeled jointly, are needed to investigate the possible impact of
such heterogeneity. This will be the subject of future research.
On the other hand, if the effect of home-ownership is not spurious, our results indicate
that home-ownership is an incentive to have more job commitment and to make specific
investments in jobs. This reinforces the job position of workers, rather than that it
weakens it by a worsening of outside opportunities. As a result, at this point we reject
Oswald’s theory. Also, from this result we cannot conclude whether job commitment
￿ and home-ownership in particular ￿ can be judged positively or negatively. From the
perspective of the employed workers, more commitment is associated with higher
income and a lower risk of becoming unemployed. For the society as a whole, it is
however unclear whether these advantages outweigh the inflexibility ￿ i.e. a lower job-
to-job mobility ￿ which is accompanied by it.
In the job duration model, we correct for several influences that relate to the
characteristics of individuals. These are: age, gender, having children, having a working
partner, being married or not, high education, disability and wage income. The reference
group consists out of working men, without children or a working partner, in the age of
16-24 years, renting a home, unmarried, not high educated, not disabled and earning an
average wage. Most of the estimated coefficients of these variables are in line with
economic intuition. For example, having a working partner decreases the risk of
becoming unemployed or becoming non-participant. Having children gives an incentive
to withdraw from the labour market, since more value is attached to household activities.
6 Conclusions
All in all, we find evidence for the Oswald theory in two cases: employed home-owners
are less likely to move than renters are, and employed home-owners are less likely to17
change jobs than renters are. However, from this alone we cannot conclude that
employed workers that own a house have worse labour market positions than renters.
Instead, their commitment to jobs makes them less vulnerable for unemployment. Also,
Oswald’s theory does not seem to hold for unemployed workers or nonparticipants.
Instead, unemployed home-owners are even more inclined to move than renters.18
Appendix: Specification of the hazard
In the context of our model, the so called hazard rate or risk measures the rate at which
for example house-owners or renter move to an owned, rental house or house of another
type. This rate, ￿, measures the probability of leaving an owned house or rental house
over a specific (small) time interval [T, T+dt], given that one has lived in that house up
to T:
(1)  ￿ = Pr ( T < t < T+dt | t ￿ T )
In the housing and job duration model, the time interval dt are normalized to one year,
and one month, respectively. The hazards or ‘competing risks’ have a proportional (or
log-linear) structure. Thus, the specification can be described as:
(2) ￿_b,i(t)  =  exp[ a xit +￿ xi ]
in which vector xi  describes time invariant individual differences, whereas xit represents
individual differences of characteristics that change over time. b denotes the index of
the competing risk (b = 1,2.. B). For example, employees have three competing risks (b
= 1,2,3): that into another job, unemployment and out of the labour market.
In the equations presented in table 2 and 3 we estimate the model according to equation
(2). The parameters describe proportional differences and can therefore easily be
interpreted. For example in table 2, Renters of 25 to 35 year old have a hazard to move
that is, ceteris paribus, only 90% (exp(-0,1137)) of that of young people under 25 years
of age. The same description of the hazard rate model holds for table 3, that describes
transitions to different labour market states.
Unobserved heterogeneity
The IPR data we use provide us with a limited number of administrative individual
characteristics. Obviously, more characteristics may be relevant in explaining
differences in e.g. the risk of unemployment, or that of moving to another house. The
more important the impact of such unobserved heterogeneity, the larger the potential
biasing impact of selection effects.
To test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, we extend the specification of the
risks (with index b) to a so called Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) structure:19
(3) ￿_b,i(t)  =  exp[ a xit +￿ xi + vb  ]
with
Pr ( vb=0 ) = P
Pr ( vb=vb
* ) = 1 - P 
In this specification, the presence of unobserved effects is modeled as two mass points
with different levels of v, with probability weights P and 1-P. Thus, the values of vb of
an individual i are equal to {0,0 .. 0} with probability P, or equal to {v1, v2 .. vB} with
probability 1- P. To test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, a Likelihood
Ratio test can be performed on the estimated parameters {v1, v2 .. vB}, together with P.
We performed this test on the job duration model (see table 3).
It should be noted, that the current specification is restrictive, in the sense that we only
allow for two mass points, and there are only two combinations of unobserved effects
for the competing risks (thus the risks are fully correlated). To make the analysis less
restrictive, it is possible to estimate two mass point and two probability masses of each
risk separately. 2021
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Abstract
This paper examines the hypotheses presented by Oswald (1999) for the Netherlands.
These are: I) Home-owners are less likely to move than renters, II) Unemployed
home-owners are less likely to move than unemployed renters, III) Owners of houses
are less likely to move to another job, because they are not willing to leave the 
region and IV) Owners of houses are more likely to become unemployed. Using
individual data of a panel of labour market and housing market histories for the
period 1989-1998, we estimate a hazard rate models, that explain transitions on these
markets. We find evidence for the Oswald theory in two cases: employed home-
owners are less likely to move than renters are, and employed home-owners are less
likely to change jobs than renters are. However, from this alone we cannot conclude
that employed workers that own a house have worse labour market positions than
renters. Instead, their commitment to jobs makes them less vulnerable for
unemployment. Also, Oswald’s theory does not seem to hold for unemployed
workers or nonparticipants. Instead, unemployed home-owners are even more
inclined to move than renters.